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Statutory Interpretation as a              
Parasitic Endeavor 
STEPHEN F. ROSS* 
Once again demonstrating the Ricardian advantages of collaborations 
between legal scholars truly expert in law and social scientists genuinely 
expert in their own discipline, What Statutes Mean is another outstanding 
“public-private” partnership between the University of San Diego and 
the University of California’s campus in that fair city.  Perhaps the most 
lasting contribution of the article is its effective articulation of a simple 
paradigm to view the entire process of statutory interpretation: “Statutes 
contain a constitutionally privileged command of the form, ‘If you are in 
situation X, then you must do Y.’”1  From this, it follows that “the 
purpose of statutory interpretation is to produce a constitutionally 
legitimate decoding of statutory commands in cases where the meaning 
of X, Y, or both is contested.”2 
These interdisciplinary collaborators, henceforth referred to as “D-
Rod and the Tritons” in the playful spirit of McNollgast,3 are at their 
 * Professor of Law, The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law, 
B.A., J.D., University of California (Berkeley).  My thanks to Roger Noll and Nick 
Weller for preliminary discussions, to Brian Gaines, Abner Mikva, and Charles Tiefer 
for “triage” in assuring me my arguments were not completely unfounded,  and to my 
Penn State colleagues for their assistance during a summer workshop. 
 1. Cheryl Boudreau, Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, 
What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons from Positive Theories of Communication and 
Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957, 958 (2007). 
 2. Id. at 958–59. 
 3. McNollgast is clever nomenclature referring to landmark tri-authored 
contributions to the legal literature by pioneering exponents of positive political theory, 
Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
The Circumstances of Politics and the Application of Statutes, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 558, 
568 n.14 (2000) (reviewing JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999)).  




best when explaining how to use a variety of social science insights to 
facilitate an accurate determination of what Congress meant in enacting 
federal laws.4  Their project sails into rougher waters in attempting to 
demonstrate that the only proper role for a judicial interpreter is to 
accurately discern legislative meaning, and that judicial canons other 
than those that accurately generalize legislative behavior are improper.  
In this regard, their “core assumption” that interpreters “should restrict 
themselves to discerning the legislature’s intended meaning”5 requires 
greater analysis. 
The principal theme of this essay is that statutory interpretation is a 
project that requires advocates and judges to utilize the insights of three 
discrete disciplines apart from law: communications and linguistics to 
understand the way that legislative drafters use words to communicate to 
others, either in text or in extratextual legislative material; political 
science to describe the way that legislators behave in enacting statutes; 
and political theory to provide a normative guide for courts interpreting 
statutes in a constitutional democracy.  Judges, lawyers, and academics 
would find the process of interpretation more coherent if they transparently 
acknowledged when and how they drew upon these other disciplines in 
crafting their work.  I apply this theme to make three specific points 
about this work and a related one by Professors McCubbins and Rodriguez.  
First, in applying communications/linguistics and political science, What 
Statutes Mean significantly contributes to statutory interpretation by 
demonstrating the foundational flaws and antidemocratic and hypocritically 
activist stance of many so-called textualists.6  Second, their insights do 
not logically lead to the conclusion that judges should only ascertain 
legislative meaning; rather, there are several reasons why judges should 
in some circumstances pursue another approach.  Determining when 
judges appropriately interpret a statute using other tools requires insights 
from the discipline of political theory.  Third, I apply the methodology 
of What Statutes Mean to McCubbins and Rodriguez’s earlier critique of 
the judicially created “appropriations canon,” agreeing that the case law’s 
hostility to appropriations legislation is unjustified; however, I conclude 
McNollgast’s major interdisciplinary contributions to the legisprudential literature 
include McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory 
Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1994) [hereinafter McNollgast, Legislative 
Intent] and McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory 
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992). 
 4. Because their first “core” assumption is that interpretation “is a project defined 
by Article I, Section 7 of the United States Constitution,” it appears that interpretation of 
state and local law would require another law review article.  Boudreau et al., supra note 
1, at 961. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 981–86. 
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that the canon is actually a defensible generalization about legislative 
behavior. 
I. 
D-Rod and the Tritons clearly and helpfully synthesize basic 
insights in communications theory to explain the process of statutory 
interpretation as one in which ideas conceived by the drafter are 
“compressed” into verbal symbols, and then these symbols are 
“expanded” into ideas in the mind of the interpreter.7  They conclude 
that “successful communication . . . requires a correspondence between 
the way that information is compressed and the way that it is 
expanded.”8  Perhaps the best way for novices to appreciate this is with 
regard to miscommunications due to mistranslations.  I recall a British 
graduate student’s aghast reaction when I referred to a former colleague 
best known for walking around the halls in his suspenders.  The British 
use the term “bracers” to describe the clothing article that holds up pants; 
suspenders are used to hold up ladies’ nylons, or “garters” in American 
English.  To assure this “correspondence” between the drafter’s “compression” 
and the interpreter’s “expansion,” the interpreter must have an understanding 
of the drafting process.  Thus, the insights of political science are essential 
to effective understanding of statutes as communications.  These 
insights can aid the interpreter in identifying reliable communications made 
by legislative leaders who, under the rules established by the House and 
Senate under constitutional mandate,9 have been delegated authority 
to control the agenda and to weed out unreliable comments made by 
others.10 
What Statutes Mean offers a powerful paradigm that significantly 
contributes to the corpus of legisprudence.  The combination of linguistics/ 
communication sciences and positive political theory that they offer 
demonstrate the need for transparency in the parasitic endeavor of 
statutory interpretation.  Their paradigm also reveals the hypocrisy in the 
current judicial politics of statutory interpretation. 
Consider their persuasive critique of the “Whole Act Rule,” a 
judicially created interpretive canon that presumes that each word in text 
 7. Id. at 964–66. 
 8. Id. at 966 (emphasis omitted). 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings . . . .”). 
 10. Boudreau et al., supra note 1, at 971–73. 




must have new and distinct meaning.11  There is no empirical support 
from communications or political scientists for the canon’s necessary 
assumption that drafters are never redundant.  Anecdotally, I recall from 
my own experience as a former legislative drafter several occasions 
when lobbyists or counsel for other senators sought to add additional 
language to a bill, despite my well-considered explanations that their 
concerns were fully addressed in the existing language.  Faced with the 
choice of adding redundant language or having to explain to my quite 
busy boss why some other senator or powerful interest group would not 
join his bill, I clearly opted for the former.  But communications science 
is not sufficient; an understanding of the legislative process is also 
required.  Even though redundancy may be a “key part of human 
communication,”12 the Whole Act Rule and its cousin, the doctrine 
against “surplusage,”13 may well reflect sound practice in other legislatures.  
In parliamentary systems characterized by strict party discipline, legislative 
amendments rarely succeed without the support of the relevant minister.  
Well-established conventions preclude the minister from approving 
amendments until they have been vetted by professional drafters in the 
Ministry of Justice, who are trained to remove such problematic syntax 
as redundancies.14 
The Whole Act Rule is not just wrong, as What Statutes Mean 
demonstrates, but systematically wrong.  Because its intellectual foundation 
remains opaque, some who find the canon problematic, such as the circuit 
judge in the case criticized in What Statutes Mean, feel uncritically 
bound to accept the canon even though it lacks an empirical foundation.15  
Even D-Rod and the Tritons fall into the muck, erroneously referring to 
the rule as one of the “so-called grammatical canons.”16  Professors 
 11. Id. at 983–86.  I analyze the Whole Act Rule in this broader sense, rather than 
the narrower and more descriptive sense of simply requiring that text be understood in 
the broader context in which the drafters were writing.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory 
Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1097 (2001). 
 12. Boudreau et al., supra note 1, at 985. 
 13. See, e.g., Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990) 
(expressing “deep reluctance” to interpret statutory provisions “so as to render superfluous 
other provisions in the same enactment”).  But see Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 
U.S. 244, 257–61 (1994) (acknowledging that petitioner’s textual argument based upon 
“the canon that a court should give effect to every provision of a statute” “has some 
force,” but refusing to accept the averred meaning because it was “unlikely that Congress 
intended the [disputed clause] to carry the critically important meaning petitioner assigns 
it”). 
 14. See Stephen F. Ross, Statutory Interpretation in the Courtroom, the 
Classroom, and Canadian Legal Literature, 31 OTTAWA L. REV. 39, 56 n.70 (1999). 
 15. Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 883 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 16. Boudreau et al., supra note 1, at 983.  This is somewhat puzzling in light of 
prior work distinguishing between canons designed to improve either specific legislative 
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Eskridge and Frickey, in their essential reference appendix compiling 
Supreme Court canons, are only a bit clearer, differentiating the Whole 
Act Rule from those based on “linguistic inferences” or “grammar and 
syntax” and placing it with other canons in a category called “textual 
integrity.”17  This broad use of the Whole Act Rule falls into a wide category 
of “normative canons” that reflect judicial views on how statutes should 
be drafted, in contrast with “descriptive canons” that actually reflect how 
drafters write.18 
The judicial bungling of the Whole Act Rule is symptomatic of the 
lack of transparency among us legal parasites in identifying the host 
discipline from which we derive our insights.  A quick trip to linguistics 
texts would show that humans do not emphasize the absence of redundancy 
in communications, and most political observers—either scholars or 
practitioners—would readily acknowledge that in American legislatures 
redundancy is useful, rather than abhorred.  We are then left with 
political theory to justify a judicial preference for “textual integrity,” 
which might be justified,19 but tends not to be. 
My second comment about their paradigm relates to judicial politics 
and the foundations of textualism.  D-Rod and the Tritons conclude that 
textualism “is suspect, and likely improper, because it entails a method 
of expansion that is inconsistent with the legislative compression 
process[].”20  This claim is far too understated.  What Statutes Mean 
significantly contributes to the cannonade attacking a critical foundation 
of the textualist project, the premise that textualism lessens judicial 
discretion and promotes effectuation of policy by elected officials.21  
outcomes or the legislative process and canons that purport to mirror legislative intent.  
Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Canonical Construction and Statutory 
Revisionism: The Strange Case of the Appropriations Canon, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 669, 690 (2005). 
 17. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 
Term—Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 97–98 (1994). 
 18. Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress 
Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1992). 
 19. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1037–38 (1989). 
 20. Boudreau et al., supra note 1, at 983. 
 21. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The 
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 14, 36 (Amy Gutmann ed., 
1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 62–63 (1988). 




William Eskridge offers another fusillade.22  In a riff on the textualist 
bromide that judicial use of legislative history is “the equivalent of 
entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the 
guests for one’s friends,”23 Eskridge responds that textualism of the sort 
practiced by Justice Scalia “is like looking out over a crowd and finding 
your friends already there, preselected.”24 
The textualists’ refusal to employ basic insights of communication 
sciences reveals that they are not really trying to discern legislative 
meaning, but impose their own.  A wonderful illustration is Blanchard v. 
Bergeron,25 which interpreted the scope of a statute granting attorneys’ 
fees to prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases.  Concurring, Justice Scalia 
castigated his eight colleagues for interpreting the statute in accord with 
a committee report which approvingly cited the approach taken by three 
lower court cases.  Assuming that a member of the committee staff or a 
lobbyist had drafted the report language, Justice Scalia wrote: “What a 
heady feeling it must be for a young staffer, to know that his or her 
citation of obscure district court cases can transform them into the law of 
the land, thereafter dutifully to be observed by the Supreme Court 
itself.”26  Although Justice Scalia disapproved of the majority opinion’s 
reliance on the committee report, he nonetheless concurred in the judgment, 
endorsing the additional justifications that the majority offered to 
explain why its ruling was “reasonable, consistent, and faithful to [the 
statute’s] apparent purpose.”27  In other words, Justice Scalia concluded 
that fees should be awarded based on what judges thought was a 
reasonable standard, rejecting the only evidence as to what the legislature 
thought was a reasonable standard.  Although criticized during her 
confirmation as a beacon of liberal activism,28 Judge Patricia Wald 
asked, in regard to this same question, whose meaning of the text should 
matter: 
Which, then, is the best source: 1) the ruminations of an article III judge who 
has turned away from legislative materials to discern independently a “pattern” 
or a “reasonable purpose” in a statute in order to shed light on an issue that the 
statutory language itself fails to clearly settle; or, 2) the admittedly non-binding, 
 22. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041 
(2006) (reviewing ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2006)). 
 23. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 24. Eskridge, supra note 22, at 2073 n.116. 
 25. 489 U.S. 87 (1989). 
 26. Id. at 99 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 27. Id. at 100. 
 28. Judge Wald was among a group of President Carter’s judicial nominees 
criticized by Senator Orrin Hatch as “avant garde liberal activists who will legislate from 
the bench.”  Carter’s Appointees Examined for Clues on Supreme Court Possibilities, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1980, at A20. 
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but often illuminating, declarations of a House or Senate report explaining what 
the committee thought it was doing, or the speech of a bill’s sponsor in which 
the sponsor declares his or her objectives in introducing the legislation?  Given 
a choice, I would pin my hopes for fidelity to the “intentions of Congress” on 
the latter.29 
According to What Statutes Mean, an express statement in a committee 
report that identified judicial precedents as illustrative of the drafters’ 
meaning is reliable.  There would be significant consequences to members 
and the staffers they employ if the cases cited in the committee report 
did not accurately reflect the majority’s approach to the legislation.  And 
what better way for a lawyer-drafter to communicate meaning to a 
judge than to provide three precedents rather than try to summarize 
their meaning in narrative text?  As Professor Arthur Corbin argued in 
the context of the interpretation of contracts, “when a judge refuses to 
consider relevant extrinsic evidence on the ground that the meaning of 
written words is to him plain and clear, his decision is formed by and 
wholly based upon the completely extrinsic evidence of his own personal 
education and experience.”30 
The verdict on textualism and activism is strengthened when we 
consider how, even when textualist judges cannot resolve interpretive 
problems via reference to their own personal views as to the plain 
meaning of textual language, they substitute judge-created presumptions 
for actual evidence of legislative intent.  Several empirical studies have 
demonstrated that the textualist attack on the use of legislative history 
and the materials that D-Rod and the Tritons demonstrate are reliable 
and helpful to determine congressional meaning has resulted in a 
significant increase in the use of what I call “normative canons.”31 
 29. Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in 
Construing Statutes in the 1988–89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. 
L. REV. 277, 305 (1990). 
 30. Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 
50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 164 (1965). 
 31. This theme has played a major role in work by leading legisprudes Jim 
Brudney and Jane Schacter, most notably James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of 
Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2005) 
and Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme 
Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and 
Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1998).  “Reliance on the judicially constructed canons is 
especially problematic because it is not clear that Congress, with its steadily declining 
proportion of lawyer-members, has any serious awareness of their existence, much less 
their specific applicability.”  James J. Brudney, Recalibrating Federal Judicial Independence, 
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 149, 180 n.113 (2003).  Judge Mikva has suggested that during his 




To refuse to utilize techniques that help explain what legislators meant 
in crafting statutes, and to substitute for these techniques a personal view 
of words’ meaning or a judicially created canon consistent with one’s 
own ideology, are the hallmarks of activism.  Some liberal activists 
openly acknowledge this.32  Whether judicial activism is a good idea requires 
assistance from the third discipline critical to statutory interpretation, 
political theory, a topic to which I will turn next.  With regard to those 
who publicly criticize activism, What Statutes Mean provides an 
excellent and thoughtful demonstration that the endorsement of textualist 
judges constitutes raw political hypocrisy.33 
II. 
What Statutes Mean extensively applies insights from communication 
science and political science to aid in accurately ascertaining legislative 
meaning.  D-Rod and the Tritons glide over a major problem in 
extended tenure in the House, the “only ‘canons’ we talked about were the ones the 
Pentagon bought that could not shoot straight.”  Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing 
Statutes, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 627, 629 (1987).  See also James J. Brudney, A Famous 
Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections and the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. 
REV. 939, 1028 (1996) (noting instances where courts use avoidance canon to frustrate 
original meaning of National Labor Relations Act in favor of nonunion employee rights); 
James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: 
Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (1994) [hereinafter Brudney, 
Congressional Commentary] (noting increased Congressional overrides of Supreme Court 
decisions that ignore legislative history in favor of judicially created canons); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE 
L.J. 331, 347–48 (1991) (concluding that Congress is more likely to override “plain 
meaning” decisions than any others, since nearly half of the overrides since 1967 address 
decisions in which the primary reasoning was plain meaning or canons-of-construction 
reasoning, whereas overrides of decisions based on statutory “purpose” are rare); 
Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A 
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 600–01 (2002) (observing that 
legislative staffers do not give canons the same degree of weight that judges do). 
 32. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 
1685, 1692–93 (1988). 
 33. J’accuse only those in the political realm who defend and appoint textualist 
judges while assailing “judicial activism.”  I acknowledge that well-meaning scholars 
adhere to the view that textualism is a legitimate “effort to limit the discretion afforded 
to judges in statutory interpretation cases because of concerns about the legitimacy of 
judicial lawmaking.”  John Copeland Nagle, The Worst Statutory Interpretation Case in 
History, 94 NW. L. REV. 1445, 1455 (2000) (reviewing WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN 
COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1999)).  Boudreau 
et al., supra note 1, demonstrates why Nagle and his academic fellow travelers are 
nonetheless misguided.  On the other hand, while Professor Nagle finds normative 
canons problematic in terms of excessive judicial discretion, see, e.g., John Copeland 
Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear Statement Rules, 1995 WIS. L. 
REV. 771, 819–21, studies by Jim Brudney and Jane Schacter, supra note 31, show how 
textualist judges who are championed as models of judicial restraint by politicians 
frequently impose clear statement rules. 
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legisprudence and political theory: whether judicial interpretation of 
statutes should ever be more than an effort to ascertain legislative intent, 
and if so when.  Fully utilizing all three relevant disciplines, in contrast, 
reveals at least three situations where judges might properly dispense 
with an approach limited to their best effort to ascertain legislative 
meaning: (1) cases where clues as to meaning are extremely weak (true 
ambiguity), (2) cases where changed circumstances cast serious doubt on 
the accuracy of meaning as a democratic effectuation of elected officials’ 
policy preferences (dynamic interpretation), and (3) cases where political 
theory justifies a non- or semi-interpretivist stance (constitutional values). 
The social sciences of linguistics/communications studies and political 
science provide, as D-Rod and the Tritons demonstrate, some excellent 
tools in allowing judges to discover helpful clues about legislative 
meaning.  However, these clues are not infallible.  Just as amazing 
technological and biochemical innovations in forensic science do not 
allow CSI teams to solve every murder, there will be statutes 
commanding courts to do Y in situation X when the words used for X are 
truly ambiguous and there is absolutely no political or legislative history 
to help resolve the specific question whether X covers the case sub 
judice.  Even when clues exist, they may be conflicting.  The political 
theory of legislative supremacy that underlies the effort to interpret 
according to ascertained meaning has significantly less force when a 
judge lacks any real confidence that she has gotten it right.34  As Einer 
Elhauge observes, statutory interpretation involves both how courts 
should determine the meaning of statutes, as well as how courts decide a 
case when it cannot divine a statute’s meaning.35 
A second area where political science and political theory combine to 
justify a departure from the pure ascertainment of legislative meaning 
arises when circumstances change.  The clearest case is reflected in the 
“absurd result” rule, dating back to English practice, that authorizes 
departure from “plain meaning” when “so applied [the words] produce 
an inconsistence, or an absurdity or inconvenience so great as to convince 
 34. McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 3, at 23–24, poses some examples 
where probabilistic analysis could result in several alternative interpretations, all with .3–
.49 probability of accuracy.  To choose among these alternatives using a constitutionally 
based political theory hardly seems contrary to D-Rod and the Tritons’ goal of a 
“constitutionally legitimate decoding.”  Boudreau et al., supra note 1, at 958–59. 
 35. Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2027, 2029 (2002). 




the Court that the intention could not have been to use them in their 
ordinary signification.”36  Somewhat more controversial is the practice 
of dynamically interpreting statutes when the judge is confident that the 
enacting legislature did not mean to “do Y in situation X” when situation 
X arises in the unforeseen context of the case sub judice. 
Embracing the principal/agent paradigm encompassed in D-Rod and 
the Tritons’ formulation “when in situation X, you shall do Y,” especially 
in the context of a long-term, repeating relationship between the 
principal (Congress) and the agent (judges who serve for life terms), 
academic advocates of dynamic interpretation observe that there are 
many nonlegal situations when the principal expects the agent to 
exercise discretion not to follow literal instructions in the face of 
changed circumstances.37  To a significant degree this reflects either the 
actual intent of the enacting Congress, or a general “meta-intent” that 
reflects an empirical claim about the general expectation of legislators.  
As to both claims, science and theory play a role.  I am reminded of a 
wonderful insight shared with my Statutory Interpretation students by 
eminent Circuit Judge Levin Campbell, who served as a Massachusetts 
state legislator and state judge before appointment to the federal bench.  
Judge Campbell reported that as a state judge he adopted a strict and 
literal approach to statutory interpretation; absent a complete travesty of 
justice, he applied the words of the text without regard to context, and 
made it a practice to correspond frequently with his former legislative 
colleagues, confident that outmoded statutes would be appropriately 
revised.  In later years he became convinced that, in contrast with his 
understanding of the legislative process on Beacon Hill, the difficulties 
in passing reform legislation through the United States Congress were so 
great that he could not presume that outmoded legislation would be 
updated, and that some form of dynamic interpretation was necessary.  
Likewise, Circuit Judge Jon Newman is inclined to construe legislation 
that is reviewed frequently by Congress, such as tax law, quite literally, 
while favoring a broader approach to foundational statutes unlikely to be 
amended like the nineteenth-century civil rights statutes.38 
Although the problem of outmoded statutes is significantly ameliorated 
by the presence of administrative agencies that can update the statute,39 
 36. River Wear Comm’rs v. Adamson, [1877] 2 App. Cas. 743, 764–65 (H.L.) (appeal 
taken from Eng.). 
 37. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319 
(1989). 
 38. Jon O. Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy 
of Institutional Values, 72 CAL. L. REV. 200, 209–10 (1984). 
 39. Absent text or reliable legislative history demonstrating that Congress had 
considered the “precise question at issue” in the case, federal courts are supposed to 
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the same issue arises with statutes that require interpretation without the 
benefit of intermediating agency determinations.  When political science40 
suggests either a specific intent that judges enforce the statute in accordance 
with legislative purpose or a general intent that judges do so, insisting on 
an interpretation in accordance with original legislative meaning cannot 
be justified by logic or by labeling the judicial role as a “core assumption.”  
It needs to be justified by a political theory, to which this essay now 
turns. 
D-Rod and the Tritons only slightly embellish their claim that judges 
should seek only to ascertain legislative meaning by citing the reverential 
Federalist No. 78, where Alexander Hamilton famously wrote that the 
judiciary was the “least dangerous” branch because, lacking power over 
the sword or the purse, judges “have neither FORCE nor WILL, but 
merely judgment . . . .”41  In defending the authority of the judiciary to 
refuse to enforce laws repugnant to the Constitution, Hamilton conceded 
that judges might be able to “substitute their own pleasure” for the 
“constitutional intentions of the legislature,” but to do so would be highly 
inappropriate.42  Judges should “declare the sense of the law; and if they 
should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the 
consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that 
of the legislative body.”43 
But there is significantly more to Federalist No. 78.  Expounding on 
his views of what constitutes appropriate “judgment” in contrast to the 
inappropriate imposition of judicial “will,” Hamilton wrote: 
    But it is not with a view to infractions of the constitution only that the 
independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of 
occasional ill humours in the society.  These sometimes extend no farther than 
to the injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and 
partial laws.  Here also the firmness of the judicial magistracy is of vast importance 
defer to any reasonable agency interpretation.  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).  When unforeseen circumstances intervene, the 
intentional question that judges need to answer—aided by political science—is whether 
the drafters preferred literal enforcement until Congress had the opportunity to review 
the issue or preferred a sensible updating by the delegated agency.  See, e.g., Regions 
Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 460 (1998) (deciding Congress more likely preferred 
“the Secretary’s exercise of authority to effectuate the Legislature’s overriding purpose” 
rather than “[e]rror perpetuation until Congress plugged the hole”). 
 40. I include here the analysis of past political science, recognizing that experts in 
this regard are often housed in departments of history. 
 41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005). 
 42. Id. at 416. 
 43. Id. 




in mitigating the severity and confining the operation of such laws.  It not only 
serves to moderate the immediate mischiefs of those which may have been 
passed, but it operates as a check upon the legislative body in passing them; 
who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of iniquitous intention are to be 
expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a manner compelled by the very 
motives of the injustice they meditate, to qualify their attempts.  This is a 
circumstance calculated to have more influence upon the character of our 
governments, than but few may be aware of.  The benefits of the integrity and 
moderation of the judiciary have already been felt in more states than one; and 
though they may have displeased those whose sinister expectations they may 
have disappointed, they must have commanded the esteem and applause of all 
the virtuous and disinterested.44 
Bill Eskridge has identified one of the cases where the “benefits of the 
integrity and moderation of the judiciary have already been felt” in a 
contemporarily famous lawsuit argued by none other than Alexander 
Hamilton himself, Rutgers v. Waddington.45  The action was a writ of 
trespass brought by a patriot whose property had been seized during the 
Revolutionary War by the British and then handed over to two 
loyalists.46  The loyalists relied on the common law defense that use of 
abandoned property was justified in time of war when authorized by 
military authorities.47  The patriot demurred in reliance of a recent New 
York statute designed to disallow the common law defense when arising 
out of the British occupation.48  Hamilton denounced the statute as contrary 
to the law of nations as incorporated in the New York constitution and 
the state’s common law.49  The judge, “mitigating the severity and 
confining the operation of” what Hamilton called “unjust and partial 
laws,” refused to apply the statute and upheld the loyalist’s defense.50  
As Eskridge recounts: 
Paraphrasing Blackstone, the court insisted that judges were required to apply 
unreasonable statutory directives, so long as they were “clearly expressed, and 
the intention manifest,” but when generally worded statutes yield unreasonable 
results in particular cases, courts are at liberty to “expound the statute by 
equity.”  The opinion recast the legal issue as whether the legislature clearly 
intended to revoke the law of nations and create a clash with the treaty of peace.  
“The repeal of the law of nations, or any interference with it, could not have 
been in contemplation, in our opinion, when the Legislature passed this statute; 
and we think ourselves bound to exempt that law from its operation . . . .”51 
 44. Id. at 416–17. 
 45. Opinion of the New York Mayor’s Court, Aug. 27, 1784, reprinted in 1 THE 
LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 393–419 (Julius Goebel Jr. ed., 1964), 
described in Eskridge, supra note 11, at 1025–26. 
 46. Eskridge, supra note 11, at 1025. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1025–26. 
 49. Id. at 1027. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1026 (footnote omitted). 
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It does not require political scientists of the caliber of Boudreau, Lupia, 
and McCubbins to discern the New York legislature’s choice between 
rigorously respecting the law of nations and allowing loyalists to profit 
at the expense of patriots during British occupation. 
Decisions by independent magistrates to mitigate the effects of unjust 
and partial laws is not a matter of political science but of political theory.  
In this case it is about why the benefits of adherence to principles of 
international law justifies, even in a democracy, judges putting their 
thumb on the scale by increasing the difficulty of passing legislation 
contrary to international norms.  It is beyond the scope of this essay to 
debate the validity of this theory, or the propriety of other “clear statement 
rules” grounded in norms derived from the Constitution.52  The claim 
here is that the purposes of sound jurisprudence in a democracy are best 
served when the theory is transparently debated and argued.53  Lawyers 
and judges should debate whether judges should apply an interpretive 
canon requiring certain kinds of meaning to be explicit, and whether 
such a canon is appropriate in the particulars of the case sub judice.  By 
the same token, the claim that clear statement rules are never appropriate 
is plausible, but it too reflects a political theory that, contrary to Hamilton’s 
view in the eighteenth paragraph of Federalist No. 78 quoted above, judges 
should not, absent a clear inconsistency with constitutional mandate, 
provide an “essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill 
humours in the society” reflected in “unjust and partial laws.” 
 52. These include the presumption of innocence (the rule of lenity in criminal 
cases), equal protection (the “Carolene canon” that construes ambiguous statutes in favor 
of discrete and insular minorities unable to participate equally in the political process), 
and federalism (the currently fashionable practice of construing federal statutes to 
preserve state prerogatives and state statutes). 
 53. Rehearsing a rich debate about judicial candor is also beyond the scope of this 
essay.  The strongest argument against candor, Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and 
Statutory Intepretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353, 406 (1989), focuses on the public perception 
of legitimacy if judges were candid about more dynamic techniques of interpretation.  
Even accepting Zeppos’s argument, it is not clear that transparency in grounding judicial 
holdings in linguistics, political science, or political theory raise the same public perception 
problems.  And forcing judges to transparently justify “normative canons” that trump 
likely legislative meaning would seem to improve public legitimacy.  I note that the 
progenitor of the concept of dynamic interpretation argues for increased candor.  William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1543, 1546 
(1987); see also Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, 
Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 558 n.117 (1992); David L. 
Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987). 




A second way in which political theory is necessary to determine 
whether or not interpreters should ascertain actual legislative meaning 
arises in the context of a conflict between the apparently plain meaning 
of a statute and seemingly reliable legislative history that suggests a 
contrary intent.  Most judges believe that when careful consideration 
reveals no textual ambiguity, they are bound to give effect to the text.54  
Social scientists are likely to ask the highly relevant question with regard 
to this apparent conflict: Why would legislators use clear text and then 
create evidence of a contrary intent?  Textualists often presume that the 
contrary legislative history is a red herring.55  Indeed, political science 
insights can often provide the tools that can explain why the contratextual 
evidence is in fact not very reliable.  At other times the political history 
seems to clearly and reliably demonstrate that the legislative intent is 
contratextual.  Some courts will give effect to this intent, especially where 
the statute was hastily drafted, while other judges insist on giving effect 
to last minute textual additions that clearly do not reflect the legislative 
bargain.56  A judge drawing on communications science will readily 
understand that people do not always mean what they say.  The example 
I use in class is that of a parent who will not hesitate to punish a child for 
refusing to come when called, if the child is the only one in the house 
and knows she is being called, even if she is being summoned by her 
sibling’s name.  A judge drawing on political science will readily understand 
that deals are often made and reflected in the legislative history without 
the appropriately careful revision of text that would have occurred if 
time permitted careful drafting.  I have previously argued that persuasive 
and reliable evidence that the legislature attached a meaning to the text 
different than the one held by the court would seem to be prima facie 
evidence that the text’s meaning is not plain.57  What justifies the strong 
judicial view that text is all that matters is not that textualists actually 
believe that each legislator pores over the text while ignoring committee 
reports and other relevant legislative history.  For textualists, political 
history is disregarded because of political theory, not political science.  
 54. ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 10 (1997). 
 55. See Justice Scalia’s critique of legislative history in Blanchard v. Bergeron, 
489 U.S. 87, 97–100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 56. Compare Shine v. Shine, 802 F.2d 583, 587–88 (1st Cir. 1986) (departing from 
literal interpretation that would allow spouse to discharge a debt that historically was 
nondischargeable, in light of absence of congressional intent and harried drafting 
process), with In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344–45 (7th Cir. 1989) (giving effect to 
literal language regarding transition provisions of Bankruptcy Act, despite evidence that 
language was contrary to purpose and specific legislative intent and relevant provision 
was inserted during last minute conference). 
 57. Ross, supra note 14, at 63. 
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Judges give effect to text because that is the way judges think the 
legislative process should work. 
Finally, parasitic interpreters can draw on both political science and 
political theory to craft canons that enhance our constitutional democracy 
by facilitating the sort of deliberative political process the Constitution 
envisions.  As Einer Elhauge has observed, a number of canons are both 
explicable and justified as “neither efforts to divine statutory meaning 
nor attempts to further judicial or legislative preferences, but rather reflect 
default rules designed to elicit legislative preferences under conditions 
of uncertainty.”58  Fully consistent with the principal thrust of What 
Statutes Mean, Elhauge argues that the best way to assure successful 
ongoing communication between Congress and the courts is for statutes 
to be interpreted by use of default rules designed to “provoke a legislative 
reaction that resolves the statutory indeterminacy” when (1) the actual 
meaning of the enacted legislation is unclear, (2) it is much more likely 
that the legislature will react to judicial adoption of one party’s proposed 
interpretation than the other’s, and (3) the interim costs inflicted by the 
adopted rule are acceptable.59  Elhauge’s approach invokes the parasitic 
nature of statutory interpretation.  It is grounded in political theory that 
views overcoming antidemocratic obstacles to ongoing review of political 
choices by current elected officials as a good thing; and political science 
which recognizes that existing statutes may not reflect current policy 
preferences because of countermajoritarian veto gates.  Implementation 
requires application of (1) linguistics and communications science, but 
only if techniques such as those offered by D-Rod and the Tritons, 
McNollgast, et al. do not yield a confident estimation of the meaning of 
the original communication; and (2) political science, as ruling for one 
side is predicted to facilitate congressional focus on the issue, resulting 
in new legislation that accurately reflects modern policy preferences.60 
 58. See Elhauge, supra note 35, at 2165. 
 59. Id. at 2165, 2166.  These default rules are a function of a variety of obstacles 
and veto gates that make the passage and interpretation of federal legislation so 
interesting.  In Judge Campbell’s perhaps idealized view of the Massachusetts Legislature, see 
supra text accompanying notes 37–38, preference eliciting rules are not necessary; all 
that is necessary to get the desired response is a letter from a judge.  Such is clearly not 
the case with Congress. 
 60. Elhauge, supra note 35, at 2168 n.9, acknowledges that his approach was 
“inspired” by Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).  This is significant in light 
of McNollgast’s express reliance on the economics of contracting with regard to the 





The ill effects of nontransparent parasitic behavior by judicial and 
academic interpreters are reflected in both case law regarding the 
appropriations canon and its criticism in another major article by two of 
What Statutes Mean’s authors, Mat McCubbins and Dan Rodriguez.61  
The canon in question is a clear statement rule that requires express 
textual support in appropriations legislation for changes in substantive 
legislation.  Opaque reasoning in judicial decisions led courts to what 
McCubbins and Rodriguez demonstrate is the erroneous conclusion that 
the use of appropriations legislation to make changes in substantive 
legislation is a bad idea that should be discouraged by judges through the 
use of a normative canon.  However, this insightful critique appears to 
overstate positive political science insights about the role that legislators 
actually intend to give to their colleagues serving on the powerful 
Appropriations Committees.  Specifically, the desirability vel non of enacting 
substantive legislation as part of the appropriations process does not 
address an alternative justification for the appropriations canon, that 
nontextual legislative history reflecting the deliberations of the Appropriations 
Committee and the intent of appropriators is not reliable evidence of 
what the vast majority of nonappropriators intend with regard to specific 
substantive legislation that, under House and Senate rules, would ordinarily 
need to be considered by another committee. 
Judicial precedent requires a clear statement to effect congressional 
policy decisions if the chosen means is substantive legislation contained 
in a statute originating from the House or Senate Appropriations Committee.62  
Courts base their antipathy to this particular legislative strategy on an 
almost casual judicial perception that substantive legislation originating in 
appropriations committees is less likely to be well considered.63  McCubbins 
and Rodriguez largely debunk these arguments.64  Using political science, 
they demonstrate that the appropriations process is no more or less 
deliberative than the process by which substantive legislation is enacted.  
application of positive political theory to statutory interpretation.  McNollgast, Legislative 
Intent, supra note 3, at 9. 
 61. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 16. 
 62. Id. at 676–85 (citing, inter alia, Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)). 
 63. Id. at 686–90. 
 64. I put to the side the plausible argument that, as a matter of political science, the 
complexity of the must-pass nature of appropriations legislation makes it an easier target 
for special interests and that as a matter of political theory, judges should interpret 
statutes in a manner to counter collective action problems recognized by public choice 
theory.  If this argument is valid, then it would justify a broader Carolene canon in favor 
of politically powerless minorities, regardless of whether the affected legislation was part 
of an appropriations measure. 
ROSS POST-AUTHOR PAGES (SUPER FINAL)1.DOC 2/7/2008  3:03:22 PM 
[VOL. 44:  1027, 2007]  Statutory Interpretation as a Parasitic Endeavor 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1043 
 
They then use political theory to argue that there is no basis for a judicial 
preference that Congress enact legislation in any particularly deliberative 
way.65  However, courts and commentators appear to have overlooked an 
alternative justification for the appropriations canon as a legitimate 
effort to discern legislative meaning. 
The leading case is Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, where Congress 
appropriated substantial sums for a major dam and hydroelectric project 
whose construction allegedly violated the Endangered Species Act.66  
The Supreme Court held that the project violated substantive law, and 
that the declaration in Appropriations Committee reports that the project 
should proceed was not sufficient to displace the text-based conclusion 
that the program was repugnant to substantive law.67 
First, the Court observed that the language of the Endangered Species 
Act plainly required that any federal agency action “authorized, funded, 
or carried out by them [did] not jeopardize the continued existence” of 
an endangered species or “result in the destruction or modification of 
habitat of such species.”68  Although the government and dissenting 
Justice Lewis Powell contended that this language was ambiguous, 
capable of being interpreted as applying only to the initial decision to 
commence a project, the Court observed that no evidence was offered to 
support this alternative meaning other than Justice Powell’s own declaration 
that it was so.  Insightfully referring to Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty, 
the majority thus recognized that a textual approach allows judges to 
declare a statute to mean whatever they want it to mean,69 and so 
concluded that the “language, structure, and history” of the Act demonstrated 
that Congress intended species protection to be a top priority, and this 
reading was consistent with the application of the Act to block the 
 65. They note that the Appropriations Committee is the largest and most representative 
committee, whose very jurisdiction attracts the attention of the most number of 
stakeholders.   McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 695.  Appropriations bills are 
more likely to be amended, id. at 697, and the bargaining process necessary to achieve 
sufficient votes to pass appropriations bills results in more deliberation than may occur 
with substantive legislation.  Id. at 701–07. 
 66. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
 67. Id. at 172–74. 
 68. Id. at 160 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976)) (emphasis and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 69. Id. at 172–74.  “‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful 
tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’”  Id. at 173 n.18 
(quoting LEWIS CARROLL, Through the Looking Glass, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF 
LEWIS CARROLL 196 (1939)). 




opening of an almost-operationally complete dam.70  Significantly, the 
Court relied upon the fact that previous legislation had required agencies 
to try to protect endangered species “insofar as is practicable and consistent 
with [the agencies’] primary purposes,”71 a provision expressly criticized 
by environmentalists during committee hearings, and that the Endangered 
Species Act expressly omitted such qualifying language.72 
The Court refused to be guided by language in the committee reports 
of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees explaining that in 
continuing to fund the controversial dam, those committees viewed the 
project as consistent with the terms of the Endangered Species Act.73  
The majority reasoned that the general interpretive approach disfavoring 
an argument that a subsequent statute impliedly repealed an earlier one 
applied “with greater force” to appropriations measures.74  Rejecting the 
argument that the clearly expressed view of appropriators contained in 
their committee reports was sufficient evidence of congressional intent 
to justify an interpretation contrary to the ordinary language of the 
substantive statute, the majority observed: 
We venture to suggest that the House Committee on Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries and the Senate Committee on Commerce would be somewhat surprised to 
learn that their careful work on the substantive legislation had been undone by 
the simple—and brief—insertion of some inconsistent language in Appropriations 
Committees’ Reports.75 
Significantly, the Court further noted that there was no evidence that 
legislators on the substantive committees or elsewhere were aware of the 
views of the government or their appropriations colleagues.76  This 
implies that, notwithstanding language in the opinion suggesting that a 
textual repeal of substantive law is essential, the result might well have 
been different if there was awareness and endorsement of the Appropriations 
 70. Id. at 174. 
 71. Id. at 175 (quoting Endangered Species Act of Oct. 15, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
699, § 1(b), 80 Stat. 926 (repealed 1973)). 
 72. Id. at 182 (citing Endangered Species Act: Hearing on H.R. 4758 Before the 
Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Env’t of the H. Comm. on 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong. 251, 335 (1973) (statement of Cynthia E. 
Wilson, Rep., National Audubon Society; statement of Robert C. Hughes, Chairman, 
Sierra Club’s National Wildlife Committee)). 
 73. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 95-379, at 104 (1977) (“It is the Committee’s view 
that the Endangered Species Act was not intended to halt projects such as these in their 
advanced stage of completion, and [the Committee] strongly recommends that these 
projects not be stopped because of misuse of the Act.”); S. REP. NO. 94-960, at 96 (1976) 
(“The Committee does not view the Endangered Species Act as prohibiting the 
completion of the Tellico project at its advanced stage and directs that this project be 
completed as promptly as possible in the public interest.”). 
 74. TVA, 437 U.S. at 190–91. 
 75. Id. at 191. 
 76. Id. at 192. 
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Committee reports, such as defeat of an amendment to the appropriations 
legislation that would have conditioned funding on full compliance with 
the Act or perhaps even a colloquy between advocates of the dam project 
and leading members of the relevant substantive committee that indicated a 
consensus that the project was consistent with the Act.77 
Obviously, the clear statement requirement of the appropriations 
canon would be met if the funding measure had contained language that 
the funds should be spent “notwithstanding the Endangered Species Act” 
or, even more generally, “notwithstanding any other provision of law.”78  
When no such statement exists, a range of possible meanings can be 
inferred from the fact of appropriation.  A decision to appropriate money 
for a dam could reflect (i) congressional intent to have the project go 
forward notwithstanding any other provision of law; (ii) a considered 
congressional determination that the funded project did not, in fact, 
violate substantive law; (iii) the unconsidered assumption that the 
funded project was lawful, with no reliable indicator of congressional 
intent if this assumption were proven false; (iv) a policy judgment that 
the funded project meets spending priorities, but should proceed only if 
it were separately determined that the project was lawful. 
Political science can aid in determining whether any of these 
alternatives are more or less probable.  The Court properly found it 
significant that each house’s internal rules disfavored the enactment of 
provisions of substantive law as part of appropriations legislation.79  In 
 77. Cf. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 1013–19 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing litigation 
involving the application of an easement-granting proviso in the Alaska National Interest 
Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980), to forest land in 
Colorado and Montana).  In Montana Wilderness Ass’n v. United States Forest Service, 
655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981), the court initially held that the proviso did not extend to 
Montana, but reconsidered when it was brought to its attention that a conference report 
on the Colorado Wilderness Act explained that the easement-granting proviso had been 
deleted from that bill because the matter had already been addressed in the Alaska 
statute. 
 78. Significantly, appropriations legislation funding the Tellico Dam did include a 
specific provision appropriating funds to carry out the purposes of the Energy 
Reorganization Act of 1974 “notwithstanding the provisions of section 3617 of the 
Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 484).”  Public Works for Water and Power Development 
and Energy Research Appropriation Act, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-180, tit. I, preamble, 89 
Stat. 1035, 1035 (1975). 
 79. The Court observed: 
House Rule XXI (2), for instance, specifically provides: 
“No appropriation shall be reported in any general appropriation bill, or 
be in order as an amendment thereto, for any expenditure not previously 




other words, the House Rules make clear that the legislative command 
“spend money” plainly means “spend money subject to existing substantive 
law” unless the text indicates otherwise.80  Legislative rules and practice 
provide a ready means for the majority to work its will in these cases: the 
Rules Committee can, when reporting the House Resolution governing 
terms of floor consideration of an appropriations measure, explicitly 
waive the rule and clearly signal an intent to permit an appropriations 
measure to change substantive law.  Indeed, this approach is precisely 
what Speaker Newt Gingrich did to enable the more loyal Appropriations 
Committee to bypass substantive committees to enact a Republican 
legislative agenda after forty years of Democratic control.81 
The appropriations canon does not impose a judicially created 
requirement that “Congress must pursue their reform objectives through 
the ordinary legislative process, that is, through adjustments to the 
authorizing legislation.”82  The canon does no more than enforce the 
legislatively created requirement that Congress must reform substantive 
legislation through substantive committees absent an explicit rule waiver.  
Indeed, giving effect to appropriations that changed substantive legislation 
would frustrate House Rules.  If the Appropriations Committee had inserted 
in text a provision that exempted the Tellico Dam from the Endangered 
Species Act, it would have been subject to a point of order; it is not 
exactly clear how the chair of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee 
could lodge a parliamentary objection to report language.83  Under these 
authorized by law, unless in continuation of appropriations for such 
public works as are already in progress.  Nor shall any provision in any 
such bill or amendment thereto changing existing law be in order.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
See also Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule 16.4.  Thus, to sustain petitioner’s 
position, we would be obliged to assume that Congress meant to repeal pro 
tanto § 7 of the Act by means of a procedure expressly prohibited under the 
rules of Congress. 
TVA, 437 U.S. at 191.  While the majority party leadership can use the Rules Committee 
to secure a rules waiver in order to legislate on an appropriations bill, the entire 
membership can also work its will by overturning a point of order.  For an illustration of 
an unsuccessful effort to pass substantive legislation with regard to the war in Iraq, see 
Charles Tiefer, Can Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exit from Iraq?, 42 STAN. J. INT’L 
L. 291, 307–09 (2006). 
 80. I thank Abner Mikva for this observation. 
 81. See John H. Aldrich & David W. Rohde, The Republican Revolution and the 
House Appropriations Committee, 62 J. POL. 1, 19 (2000). 
 82. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 691. 
 83. As the Court noted: 
When voting on appropriations measures, legislators are entitled to operate 
under the assumption that the funds will be devoted to purposes which are 
lawful and not for any purpose forbidden.  Without such an assurance, every 
appropriations measure would be pregnant with prospects of altering substantive 
legislation, repealing by implication any prior statute which might prohibit the 
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circumstances, a statement inserted into a committee report of the 
Appropriations Committee, which if included in the text would have 
been subject to a point of order for violating House Rules, is not the act 
of a legislator “acting as an agent for the majority.”84  If House leaders 
really wanted to exempt the Tellico Dam, the modest cost of explicitly 
doing so and waiving the rules could achieve the goal.  Therefore, it is 
more likely that the report language reflected the House leaders’ 
tolerance for appropriators scoring political points with special interests 
by inserting “cheap talk” report language demonstrating their support for 
a contested interpretation of existing law.  Thus, in McNollgastian terms, the 
House Rules demonstrate both a desire to permit substantive committees 
to act as veto gates on changes in substantive legislation85 and a view 
expenditure.  Not only would this lead to the absurd result of requiring 
Members to review exhaustively the background of every authorization before 
voting on an appropriation, but it would flout the very rules the Congress 
carefully adopted to avoid this need. 
TVA, 437 U.S. at 190–91. 
 84. McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 3, at 24. 
 85. Id. at 18.  McCubbins and Rodriguez believe that Tennessee Valley Authority v. 
Hill incorrectly ascertained legislative meaning, and others believe it was an unnecessary 
triumph of formalism over reality.  See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 15–23 
(1986).  My analysis suggests that the prompt overturning of the Court’s decision, 
Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (codified at 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1543 (1982)), doubtless required Tellico Dam advocates to pay some 
political price to secure the acquiescence of environmentalists on the Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries Committee, which is exactly the design of the House Rules in giving the 
substantive committee exclusive jurisdiction over substantive law.  Indeed, the statute 
was strongly supported by the Tennessee congressional delegation and was part of a 
political deal to obtain a three-year authorization of the Endangered Species Act.  See 
Environmental Law Institute, 96th Congress, 1st Session: Environmental Issues in 
Limbo, 10 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,009, 10,013 n.54 (1980).  A provision in the new legislation 
creating a cabinet-level committee to resolve exemption issues may actually have 
strengthened the statute because exemptions became so difficult to obtain.  See Zygmunt 
J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental Law Paradigm and Its 
Consequences, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 805, 828 (1986).  Cf. Brudney, Congressional 
Commentary, supra note 31, at 16–20 (describing how new Supreme Court decisions 
restrictively interpreting civil rights laws required use of additional political capital that 
doomed other legislation that likely would have passed).  For this reason, I respectfully 
disagree with Bill Eskridge, supra note 31, at 339–40, that the failure to credit the 
Appropriations Committee report language is “blinking reality”; while Eskridge is 
agnostic on whether the decision and responsive legislation authorizing the dam 
“imposed unnecessary burdens on the congressional agenda (which is very limited),” id. 
at 340 n.76, I conclude that the burden of passing new legislation is precisely that 
intended by the House Rules that designate the Merchant Marine and Fisheries 
Committee as a veto gate.  Elhauge, supra note 35, at 2220–21, defends the decision 
along similar lines. 




that the interests reflected in substantive committees are presumed to be 
influential in most legislative bargains.  Language in appropriations reports 
to the contrary are efforts to evade congressionally designated veto gates 
and are thus unreliable.86 
McCubbins and Rodriguez reach a contrary conclusion, as they read 
too much into prior work about the reasons why overall fiscal policies 
are delegated to the Appropriations Committees, whose perspective and 
composition are more likely to reflect the policy preferences of the 
majority party leadership than majorities on substantive committees.87  
But it is quite a leap in the logic of delegation to suggest that, contrary to 
the express design of the rules of each chamber, the Appropriations 
Committees are intended to serve as general committees of revision 
empowered to update the vast body of statutes Congress has previously 
passed.  McCubbins and Rodriguez assert that Tennessee Valley Authority v. 
Hill “misunderstands the legislative process”88 in predicting that the 
overwhelming majority of legislators who are not members of the 
Appropriations Committees acquiesce in allowing their vaunted colleagues 
to undo substantive legislation by inserting language in Appropriations 
Committee reports.  It is with extreme temerity that I dispute a political 
scientist of Mat McCubbins’s caliber in his own pond, so to speak; I 
confess my skepticism draws largely from my own experience as a staff 
 86. McCubbins and Rodriguez’s critique of the district court decision in U.S. 
Security v. FTC, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (W.D. Okla. 2003), rev’d in part sub nom. 
Mainstream Mktg. Servs. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004), misses the point in this 
regard.  McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 673–74.  In holding that the FTC 
lacked authority to create a do-not-call registry, the judge disregarded appropriations 
legislation that funded the creation of the registry by the FTC from fees.  U.S. Security, 
282 F. Supp. 2d at 1292.  The legislative history recounted in McCubbins & Rodriguez, 
supra note 16, at 671–75, shows that the substantive legislation governing the FTC did 
indeed allow such an authorization, and so the judge was properly reversed.  If one 
accepted the judge’s misguided claim that the lack of express authority to promulgate a 
do-not-call list precluded the FTC’s doing so, and his further misguided claim that a 
specific statute, the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 6101–08 (1994), did not create sufficient authority, then I do not believe that 
appropriations for unauthorized activities should suffice to effectively expand the FTC’s 
jurisdiction. 
Consider instead a closer debate about FTC authority: its contested authority to 
regulate the commercial activities of nonprofit organizations designed to serve the profit-
seeking interests of their members.  The Supreme Court held in California Dental Ass’n 
v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 759 (1999), that the FTC had such jurisdiction, although the issue 
was sufficiently in doubt to require a grant of certiorari.  Id. at 764–65.  In my view, the 
inclusion in the legislative history of the FTC’s 1998 appropriations of comments by the 
House and Senate committees that a portion of the FTC’s funds should go to 
investigating anticompetitive practices of nonprofit professional associations should not 
have been particularly relevant to the Court’s determination of the issue.  See id. at 768–69. 
 87. D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION: 
CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 132–33 (1991). 
 88. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 699. 
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attorney for a substantive committee (Senate Judiciary), but for scholarly 
purposes I will limit my argument to an assertion that the political 
science literature cited in Canonical Construction simply does not 
demonstrate their claim.89  They argue that substantive committees are not 
representative of the entire chamber, and that the ability of substantive 
committees to achieve undesired policy outcomes is inhibited by the 
Rules Committee, the majority party leadership, and the need for many 
policies to receive adequate funding to be effectuated, thus requiring 
support from appropriators.  But they acknowledge that veto gates exist that 
can frustrate passage of policies that may well attract majority support.90  
Curiously, they fail to reach the conclusion that among the veto gates are 
substantive committees, and that each house’s rules are expressly 
designed to make it difficult, albeit not impossible, for a chamber’s 
majority (much less the tacit acquiescence of the majority to the views of 
a majority of appropriators) to work its will over the objection of the 
relevant substantive committees.91  It is unclear why and on what evidence 
we are now supposed to conclude that the House leadership believe this 
 89. See, e.g., infra note 94. 
 90. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 700–01.  Substantive committees 
are archetypical veto gates if we accept the definition by the concept’s originators: a 
person or committee whose actions can significantly affect the course of legislation, 
most importantly by imposing costs on subsequent decisionmakers seeking to reverse 
their policy choices.  McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 3, at 7. 
 91. One can certainly imagine a legislature designed to enhance majority party 
control by allowing the Speaker to appoint members of the fiscal committee and giving 
such a committee revision powers over substantive legislation before the bills went to the 
floor.  Indeed, this describes the California legislature.  WILLIAM K. MUIR, JR., LEGISLATURE: 
CALIFORNIA’S SCHOOL FOR POLITICS 28–29 (1982).  As McNollgast observed: “[T]he 
legislature can choose a degree of difficulty for changing a policy bargain through its 
choice of institutional rules and structures.”  McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra 
note 3, at 11.  Thus, successful legislation must pass through numerous veto gates: 
“[A]greement must be reached among House and Senate committees, the majority party 
leadership in both chambers, majorities in both chambers, and the president.”  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
The accuracy of the appropriations canon as a means of preserving desired veto gates 
should not be confused with periodic moves to enhance the effectiveness of the 
Appropriations Committee as a veto gate as well.  Thus, over its history the House has 
created a notable exception to the ban on substantive legislation on appropriations 
legislation (the so-called Holman Rule) when the effect is to limit expenditures.  See 
KIEWIET & MCCUBBINS, supra note 87, at 66–71.  This does not, as claimed, “erase[] the 
boundary between the jurisdiction of Appropriations and that of other House committees.”  
Id. at 66.  Certainly, where the Appropriations Committee desires to spend money on 
programs that violate substantive law, such as the Tellico Dam, the exception would not 
apply.  Rather than allowing an evisceration of the substantive committee’s veto powers, 
it simply adds another veto gate. 




degree of difficulty is so great that party leaders should now be able to 
easily amend substantive law by securing favorable language in an 
Appropriations Committee report.92  Although McCubbins and Rodriguez 
demonstrate that “the intra-Congressional structure of policymaking 
delegation and control works as effectively in the appropriations process” as 
in the process of enacting substantive legislation,93 this does not support 
the claim that report language or other indicia of the views of key 
appropriators are reliable in determining whether appropriations 
legislation was intended to supplant substantive law.94 
 92. Even at the apex of leadership control under Speaker Newt Gingrich, reflecting 
an expressed desire to achieve the majority party agenda by using appropriations 
legislation to secure changes in substantive law by evading the veto gates of the 
substantive committees and President Clinton, the leadership used express waivers 
proposed by the Rules Committee to effectuate these changes.  Aldrich & Rohde, supra 
note 81, at 7–22. 
 93. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 701. 
 94. In connection with its claim that TVA “misunderstands the legislative process” 
in its solicitude for the turf-protecting interests of substantive committees, McCubbins & 
Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 698–701, also cites two other political science resources: 
GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY GOVERNMENT IN 
THE HOUSE 83–135 (1993) (miscited in McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 16, at 700 
n.117) and Gary W. Cox & Mathew D. McCubbins, Agenda Power in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, 1877–1986, in PARTY, PROCESS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN CONGRESS: 
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE HISTORY OF CONGRESS 107 (David W. Brady & Mathew D. 
McCubbins eds., 2002).  Each discusses positively (and implicitly normatively) how and why 
party leaders control the legislative agenda.  See, e.g., COX & MCCUBBINS, supra, at 83; 
Cox & McCubbins, supra, at 110.  Neither of these sources demonstrates the claim that 
party leadership control over the work of substantive committees is so strong that House 
members do not want the substantive committees to serve as veto gates, or that it is too 
costly to impose the burden on party leaders and their agents on the Appropriations 
Committee of expressly repealing substantive law and getting a waiver from the Rules 
Committee. 
Some prior work suggests a normative hostility to rules designed to preserve the veto 
power of substantive committees, which are less representative of the entire chamber 
than the party leadership or appropriators.  See, e.g., KIEWIET & MCCUBBINS, supra note 
87, at 12, 239 n.4 (noting that detailed rules limiting jurisdiction of Appropriations 
Committee to preclude substantive legislation is “ironic” because “Congress has 
attempted to establish through a web of tradition and precedent a distinction that cannot 
be made in principle”).  Consistent with the thesis of this essay, McCubbins and 
Rodriguez are of course free to make a transparent normative argument that courts 
should give effect to unreliable legislative history in the form of Appropriations 
Committee report language on the grounds that unrepresentative substantive committees 
should not serve as veto gates and judges should facilitate the process by which their 
work can be easily evaded.  However, McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 16, does not 
seek to make this argument.  With similar opacity from the opposite perspective, see 
Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 
296–97 (1989).  Farber praises the Court’s decision as faithful to legislative supremacy, 
while arguing that the effect of a contrary result would be to require careful scrutiny by 
all members of all Appropriations Committee reports, which “would have undesirable 
effects on the legislative process” and would “merely invite special interests to abuse the 
appropriations process as a means of undercutting substantive legislation.”  Id. at 296.  
Responding to Ronald Dworkin’s claim that legislators who voted to enact the 
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* * * * * 
What Statutes Mean is an important contribution to the literature.  Its 
contributions are somewhat obscured, however, by the lack of transparency 
in the interpretive approach the authors take, an opacity widely shared 
by judges and academics.  Clearly recognizing that statutory interpretation 
requires lawyers to borrow from linguistics and communications sciences, 
positive political science, and normative political theory will improve 
the quality of reasoning that underlies the interpretive effort.  Such 
transparency reveals that judicial textualists, who prefer their personal 
views on the meaning of a text to insights from communications and 
political sciences about what legislative drafters actually meant, are 
activists effectively replacing legislative judgments with their own.  It 
also shows that a variety of political theories can in some cases justify 
the displacement of the search for actual legislative meaning.  Applying 
these insights to the prior work by two authors of What Statutes Mean 
suggests that judges should not narrowly construe appropriations 
legislation because of a hostility to the use of such legislation to reform 
substantive law, but may properly refuse effect to textual ambiguities or 
even clear extratextual evidence of the intent of appropriators about the 













Endangered Species Act did not really mean what they said—or, more to the point, 
intended judges to apply the statute in a contratextual way (a point belied by the post-
decision legislation placing such authority in the hands of a cabinet-level committee), 
Farber likewise responds normatively, not positively: “If judges want the legislature to 
act with integrity, they must hold legislators to their public positions.  Judges must not 
allow legislators to use statutes to strike poses, knowing that courts will bail them out 
later.”  Id. at 298 (discussing DWORKIN, supra note 85). 
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